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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on African economic 
development: the place of Africa on the maps of global economic, political and 
social values. We develop new comparable indices of global value development 
from the latest set of World Values Survey data and determine Africa’s place on 
a new factor analytical index of Global Civil Society.  
 
Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS 
statistical program (SPSS XXIV), available at many academic research centers 
around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, 
underlying the correlation matrix. The SPSS routine chosen in this context was 
the so-called promax rotation of factors, which in many ways must be 
considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.  
 
Our analysis of the World Values Survey data derived the following factor 
analytical scales, well compatible with a large social scientific literature: 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society 
2. Democracy movement  
3. Climate of personal non-violence  
4. Trust in institutions  
5. Happiness, good health  
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism  
7. Accepting the market  
8. Feminism  
9. Involvement in politics  
10. Optimism and engagement  
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics  
 
The spread in the performance of African countries with complete data is really 
amazing. While we are especially hopeful about the development of future 
democracy in Ghana, our article suggests pessimistic tendencies for Egypt and 
Algeria, and especially for Africa’s leading economy, South Africa. High 
Human Inequality, as measured by the UNDP’s Human Development Report’s 
Index of Human Inequality, further impairs the development of Human Security. 
 
One can maintain that the certain recent optimism, corresponding to economic 
and human rights data, emerging from Africa, is reflected also in our Index of 
the Development of Civil Society. There is at least some hope for Africa, on this 
front, too. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on African economic 
development: the place of Africa on the maps of global economic, political and 
social values.  
 
International literature on comparative global economic, social and political 
values already developed comparative frameworks possibly to be applied to new 
emerging cross-national data, now covering a number of African countries 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Davidov et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and 
Minkov, 2010; Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2010; Minkov and 
Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). This essay 
is within this literature tradition and develops a new comparable index of global 
value development from the latest set of World Values Survey data and 
determines Africa’s place on a new measurement scale of Global Civil Society. 
Debates about these phenomena have gathered in pace in recent literature, 
especially in the framework of Inglehart’s new theory of global cultural 
evolution (Inglehart, 2018).  
 
In this paper, we debate the theoretical background, present an overview of the 
methods and data, and then portray the most important empirical results. We 
then present the conclusions from our findings and allow the specialists an 
insight into our empirical materials in the Appendix. 
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The new optimism regarding African development 
 
In his new and very encompassing analysis, Inglehart (2018) maintains that that 
people's values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which survival is 
secure; it was precarious for most of history, which encouraged heavy emphasis 
on group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and obedience to strong leaders. High 
levels of existential security encourage openness to change, diversity, and new 
ideas. The unprecedented global prosperity and security of the postwar era 
brought cultural change, the environmentalist movement, and the spread of 
democracy. But, Inglehart maintains, in recent decades, diminishing job security 
and rising inequality have led to an authoritarian reaction in the developed 
countries. Inglehart maintains that people's motivations and behavior reflect the 
extent to which they take survival for granted - and that modernization changes 
them in roughly predictable ways. What is the place of Africa in such a macro-
sociological comparison? 
 
In the framework of debates about international values, it should be recalled that 
recent literature on global economic development also highlighted the 
importance of the factor “trust” for economic development (Alesina, Algan et 
al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). Gallup data made available in UNDP 
HDR (Human Development Report), 2014, projected onto a choropleth map, 
highlight the deficits of trust in most African countries (Map 1). The global 
empirical evidence seems to suggest the deficit of trust in several African 
countries indeed is a problem, if we understand economic growth in the 
framework of Alesina’s approach, but that this lack of trust is not unique to 
Africa and can also be found in large regions of Southern and Southeastern 
Europe, just to mention a few.  
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Map 1: Gallup/UNDP HDR 2014 data about trust in other people 
 
 
 
In our paper, we attempt nothing more and nothing less than to develop an Index 
of Civil society in the framework of the larger necessary debates about 
Inglehart’s approach (2018), which works with the following scales and data: 
 
➢ Attitudes on democracy 
➢ Attitudes on gender equality 
➢ Background data like age, gender, state of health, feeling of happiness, 
feeling of security 
➢ Confidence in economic and political institutions 
➢ Global citizenship 
➢ Interest in politics 
➢ Positions on the market economy, like competition, inequality, private 
enterprise 
➢ What is important in life 
➢ What is justifiable and what is not justifiable 
➢ Work ethics 
➢ Xenophobia 
 
The results of our empirical survey show that on this front, there is room for 
optimism and hope for the coming decades for Africa. African economic 
development in some countries has decidedly shifted away from the “lost 
0,38 to 7,00
7,00 to 13,63
13,63 to 20,25
20,25 to 26,88
26,88 to 33,50
33,50 to 40,13
40,13 to 46,75
46,75 to 53,38
53,38 to 60,00
60,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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continent” image and the debate has increasingly featured such factors as good 
governance as decisive for Africa’s future trajectory in world society (Noman, 
2012; Pieper, Mkandawire and van der Hoeven, 2016). Figures and maps that 
several countries in Africa are rapidly moving forward in economic and also in 
human rights terms now abound; it suffices here to mention the data work of 
Freedom House (2018).  
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Table 1: The advance of Freedom in Africa, 2013-2018 
 
Country/Territory Freedom Score 
2018 
Freedom Score 
2013 
Increase/decrea
se of Freedom 
(Freedom 
Development, 
2013-2018) 
Global percentile 
performance, 
2018 
Global percentile 
performance 
Freedom 
development, 
2013-2018 
Cape Verde 90 90 0 19,62 5,74 
Mauritius 89 90 -1 22,01 13,40 
Ghana 83 84 -1 29,19 14,83 
Sao Tome and Principe 82 81 1 31,10 30,62 
Benin 82 82 0 30,14 6,70 
South Africa 78 81 -3 35,41 33,49 
Namibia 77 76 1 37,32 32,06 
Senegal 75 75 0 37,80 7,66 
Seychelles 71 67 4 41,63 12,92 
Tunisia 70 59 11 42,58 3,35 
Sierra Leone 66 70 -4 45,45 38,76 
Lesotho 64 72 -8 47,37 55,98 
Malawi 63 60 3 48,33 18,66 
Liberia 62 60 2 49,28 24,40 
Burkina Faso 60 53 7 51,67 7,18 
Madagascar 56 35 21 54,55 0,96 
Zambia 55 62 -7 57,42 51,20 
Comoros 55 55 0 55,98 8,61 
Tanzania 52 66 -14 59,33 61,24 
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Mozambique 52 59 -7 58,37 51,67 
Cote d'Ivoire 51 34 17 59,81 2,39 
Nigeria 50 46 4 60,29 14,83 
Niger 49 56 -7 61,24 52,15 
Kenya 48 55 -7 61,72 52,63 
Togo 47 43 4 62,20 15,31 
Somaliland 44 46 -2 65,55 28,71 
Mali 44 24 20 64,59 1,44 
The Gambia 41 23 18 68,90 1,91 
Guinea-Bissau 41 30 11 67,94 3,83 
Guinea 41 39 2 67,46 24,88 
Morocco 39 43 -4 69,38 39,71 
Uganda 37 40 -3 70,81 34,93 
Maldives 35 46 -11 72,25 57,89 
Algeria 35 35 0 71,77 10,05 
Zimbabwe 30 25 5 76,08 11,00 
Mauritania 30 34 -4 75,12 40,19 
Egypt 26 41 -15 79,43 61,72 
Djibouti 26 29 -3 78,95 35,41 
Angola 26 30 -4 78,47 40,67 
Rwanda 23 24 -1 82,30 19,62 
Gabon 23 34 -11 81,34 58,37 
Cameroon 22 23 -1 82,78 20,10 
Congo (Brazzaville) 21 29 -8 84,21 56,94 
Chad 18 21 -3 86,12 36,36 
Congo (Kinshasa) 17 20 -3 87,08 36,84 
Swaziland 16 21 -5 88,04 46,89 
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Ethiopia 12 18 -6 90,91 48,80 
Libya 9 43 -34 94,26 65,07 
Central African Republic 9 35 -26 93,30 63,64 
Sudan 8 7 1 94,74 34,93 
Somalia 7 2 5 96,17 11,96 
Equatorial Guinea 7 8 -1 95,22 20,57 
Eritrea 3 3 0 98,09 10,53 
South Sudan 2 31 -29 99,04 64,59 
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In 2018, Cape Verde and Mauritius, the best placed African countries on the 
scale of global freedom, developed by Freedom House (2018), ranked as well as 
France, Slovakia, and Italy, and were even ahead of Latvia and the United 
States. Ghana now outperforms the European Union countries Bulgaria and 
Hungary and was ahead of several European Union membership candidate 
countries. 
 
Not only freedom made big strides in Africa in recent years, also the economy 
of several countries gives room for hope. The following two maps which we 
include here dramatically highlight such more optimistic tendencies in a 
nutshell: the improvements of several African countries in the global ranks of 
the UNDP Human Development Index after the global economic crisis of 2008, 
and UNDP Human Development growth since 2000. For Inglehart, 2018, there 
is a clear connection between the level of Human Development, existential 
security, and what he calls “cultural evolution” (Inglehart, 2018), but which we 
rather prefer to call here the evolution of a civil society: 
 
Map 2: UNDP HDI (Human Development Index), 2013, combining 
education, income and longevity 
 
 
  
0,26 to 0,34
0,34 to 0,41
0,41 to 0,49
0,49 to 0,56
0,56 to 0,64
0,64 to 0,72
0,72 to 0,79
0,79 to 0,87
0,87 to 0,94
0,94 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 3: Improvements in the ranks of African countries on the scales of the 
UNDP Human Development Index, 2008-2013 
 
 
 
  
-15,63 to -12,00
-12,00 to -8,38
-8,38 to -4,75
-4,75 to -1,13
-1,13 to 2,50
2,50 to 6,13
6,13 to 9,75
9,75 to 13,38
13,38 to 17,00
17,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 4: average annual UNDP Human Development Growth, 2000-2013 
 
 
 
The rhythm of Human Development and “cultural evolution”, Inglehart argues, 
is also conditioned by inequality (Inglehart, 2018), while other global value 
research has also shown the overriding importance of life satisfaction (Tausch, 
Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). Map 5 captures the UNDP HDR/Gallup data on 
overall life satisfaction in 2013.  
  
-0,34 to 0,07
0,07 to 0,48
0,48 to 0,89
0,89 to 1,30
1,30 to 1,71
1,71 to 2,12
2,12 to 2,53
2,53 to 2,94
2,94 to 3,35
3,35 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 5: Overall life satisfaction – Gallup Poll/UNDP HDR 2014 
 
 
 
The Coefficient of Human Inequality, introduced in the 2014 UNDP HDR as an 
experimental measure, is a simple average of inequalities in health, education 
and income. The average is calculated by an unweighted arithmetic mean of 
estimated inequalities in these dimensions. The UNDP emphasizes that when all 
inequalities are of a similar magnitude, the coefficient of human inequality and 
the loss in HDI differ negligibly, but when inequalities differ in magnitude, the 
loss in HDI tends to be higher than the coefficient of human inequality. 1 As far 
as the available data allow conclusions, it must be maintained that in most 
African countries the performance is very deficient, suggesting that Africa today 
is the real global focus of Human Inequality, and that only in some countries of 
West Asia and South Asia, and in some Latin American nations, similar high 
rates of Human Inequality are to be encountered. Thus, inequality must be 
regarded as one of the main blockades against the spread of Human Security, so 
vital in Inglehart’s theory of the evolution of human values (Inglehart, 2018). 
 
  
                                                          
1 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-does-coefficient-human-inequality-measure 
2,29 to 2,90
2,90 to 3,51
3,51 to 4,13
4,13 to 4,74
4,74 to 5,35
5,35 to 5,96
5,96 to 6,58
6,58 to 7,19
7,19 to 7,80
7,80 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 6: The UNDP HDR 2014 Coefficient of Human Inequality by 
international comparison 
 
 
 
The world, which emerges out of the global economic crisis of 2008, in a way 
was predicted by Frank (1998) with his theory of a global shift of economic 
growth away from the Euro-Atlantic arena towards China and India, with 
economic dynamism now extending not only to the rim countries of the Pacific, 
but the Indian Ocean as well. In this paper, we attempt to contribute new 
empirical data on African economic, social and political values in the framework 
of this realistic and at the same time partially optimistic approach. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
To begin with, most earlier studies on African values were centered around 
Hofstede’s approach to global value studies (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & Roth, 
2017), for which there are only few comparable cross-national value data 
available for Africa. In one recent comprehensive survey (Tausch, Heshmati and 
Karoui, 2014), it could be shown that the original Hofstede data can be only 
extracted for Morocco, so that the application of Hofstede’s approach, which 
received priority in the literature, hitherto written on “African values” in 
economics, would first of all have to overcome the problem of missing original 
survey data, measuring Hofstede’s theory.  
 
0,74 to 5,50
5,50 to 10,26
10,26 to 15,03
15,03 to 19,79
19,79 to 24,55
24,55 to 29,31
29,31 to 34,08
34,08 to 38,84
38,84 to 43,60
43,60 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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According to Hofstede and his school, which still might be very relevant to 
explain African value development at least in theory, there are four to six basic 
clusters of international value systems, and they are all defined along the scales 
of how different national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways 
of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his 
primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or 
as a boy. Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as  
 
• Power Distance 
• Individualism vs. Collectivism 
• Masculinity versus Femininity 
• Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
• Long-Term Orientation 
• Indulgence versus Restraint 
 
Some of the empirical factors, developed from the new cross-national data of the 
World Values Survey, integrating a sufficient number of representative surveys 
of African publics, bear resemblance to the Hofstede factors, highlighted above. 
 
So, how different or similar is Africa from the rest of the world in its values in 
the light of new cross-national perspectives and data? The systematic social 
scientific study of global values and opinions, used in this essay, has of course a 
long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Such 
studies are made possible by the availability of systematic and comparative 
opinion surveys over time under the auspices of leading representatives of the 
social science research community, featuring the global population with a fairly 
constant questionnaire for several decades now. The original data are made 
freely available to the global scientific publics and render themselves for 
systematic, multivariate analysis of opinion structures on the basis of the 
original anonymous interview data. 2 Our data are from such reliable and 
regularly repeated global opinion surveys: The World Values Survey (WVS). 
 
The World Values Survey (WVS), which was started in 1981, consists of nationally 
representative surveys using a common questionnaire conducted in approximately 
100 countries, which make up some 90 percent of the world’s population. Africa 
is now much better presented than ever before in these surveys. The WVS has 
become the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of 
human beliefs and values ever conducted. As of the time of writing this article, it 
includes interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. The countries included in 
the WVS project comprise practically all of the world’s major cultural zones. 
 
                                                          
2 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp and http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
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As already highlighted above, for a number of years now, also some leading 
economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion data from 
the World Values Survey (Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 
2015). The interest of the economics profession in the relationship between 
religion and economic growth certainly was a factor contributing to the rise of 
the present methodological approach, also employed in this study (McCleary 
and Barro, 2006). 
 
In the present article, we feature on African values in the framework of the 
“civic culture” of the respective African societies (Almond and Verba, 2015). 
The analysis of our comparative data makes the rethinking of the entire tradition 
of empirical comparative value research in the direction of the classical political 
science research on the “civic culture” of countries and even entire global 
cultures necessary and useful. Here, one encounters the full legacy of twentieth-
century modern political scientist Gabriel Abraham Almond (1911–2002): with 
his deep understanding of the normative aspects of human society he perhaps 
came closest to capturing the dilemmas of Western and non-Western, non-
Muslim and Muslim contemporary societies of today, as they emerge from the 
empirical data. He did so especially by pointing out the many adverse trends in 
the civic culture in leading Western democracies themselves, brought about by 
the current contemporary erosion of social capital, a declining civic engagement, 
and civic trust (Almond, 1996). As causes of this contemporary decline in civic 
engagement, Almond cites in reference to the work of the political scientist 
Robert D. Putnam the weakening of the family (Putnam, 1993). A second major 
factor that Almond cites is the transformation of leisure by the electronic media. 
This tidal wave of value decay has begun to affect communities in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and Oceania as well. 
 
The civic culture approach presupposes that a political culture congruent with a 
stable democracy involves a high degree of consensus concerning the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions and the content of public policy (for a survey of the 
relevant literature, see Tausch, 2016).  
 
Inglehart by contrast developed an interpretation of global value change that rests 
on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change 
(Inglehart, 2018). It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to 
some 20 key World Values Survey variables. The two Inglehart dimensions are: 
(1) the traditional/secular-rational dimension and (2) the survival/self-expression 
dimension. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-
national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these 
dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. For 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000, all of the preindustrial societies show relatively low 
levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize 
male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, 
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and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; and most of 
them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to 
have the opposite characteristics (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). 
 
Inglehart, therefore, predicted a more or less generalized global increase in human 
security in parallel with the gradual waning of the religious phenomenon in the 
majority of countries across the globe. Inglehart spells out what tendencies are 
brought about by the waning of the religious element in advanced Western 
democracies: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the 
erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life, etc. 
When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't 
"enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take 
away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, 
and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize 
predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken 
for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable - indeed, 
beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may even be positively 
valued because it is seen as interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial 
societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisines; they pay large 
sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing 
gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening.  
 
Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal opinion 
survey data from the World Values Survey have discovered that there are pretty 
constant and long-term patterns of change in the direction of secularization 
(Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). For 
Inglehart, such phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the state 
to get government benefits for which one wouldn’t be entitled, but also the 
counterveiling healthy activism of citizens in volunteer organizations, already 
described by Etzioni, 1998, hardly exist, while the rich database of the World 
Values Survey provides ample evidence about these phenomena and their 
occurrence in world societies. The economics profession, that is, mathematical, 
quantitative economics, already began to make large-scale use of the World 
Values Survey data, integrating the WVS country level results into international 
economic growth accounting (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Barro and McCleary, 
2003, 2006). Thus, the art of “growth accounting” received a new and 
important input (Barro, 1991, 1998, 2004; 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 
1993; Guiso et al., 2003). Following Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard 
work - which brings success-, competition, which is the essence of a free market 
economy together with the private ownership of business, play an overwhelming 
role in twenty-first century capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical 
global value research. 
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Data and methods for our comparisons 
 
So, this essay firmly shares the established methodology of World Values Survey 
- based comparative opinion research (Davidov et al., 2008; Inglehart, 2006; 
Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). We should re-
iterate that our methodological approach is within a more general framework to 
study African values with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey 
based political science (Basanez and Inglehart, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 
2015).  
 
We are of course well aware of many past valuable attempts to arrive at 
theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons of global 
values. However, our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics 
from the World Values Survey data is based on recent advances in mathematical 
statistical factor analysis (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). Such studies are 
based on existing comparative opinion survey data, which allow to project the 
underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.  
 
Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS 
statistical program (SPSS XXIII), 3 available at many academic research centers 
around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, 
underlying the correlation matrix (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). The 
SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called promax rotation of factors 
(Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), which in many ways must be considered 
to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.4 Since both 
our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any 
researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available open data and 
should be able to reproduce the same results as we did. 
 
In each comparison, based on the national factor scores for each of the factors, 
resulting from our research (for surveys of the factor analytical method see 
Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014) we evaluated the democratic civil society 
commitment of the overall population of the respective African and non-African 
countries. 
 
The roll-out of the data, freely downloaded from the WVS website, was: 
G:\Analyses 2016\WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_spss_v2015_04_18.sav. We 
                                                          
3 https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/ 
4 Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best 
representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to 
understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume 
that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union 
attitudes.  
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took great care in assuring that the variable names reflect the highest numerical 
values in the questionnaire and thus they might differ from the original variable 
label in the WVS. In the following, we shortly present our main research results. 
 
Results: The global evidence based on the World Values Survey  
 
Our analysis of the World Values Survey data derived the following factor 
analytical scales of a Democratic Civil Society, well compatible with a large 
social scientific literature: 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999) 
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993) 
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993) 
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995) 
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005) 
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000) 
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; 
Hayek, 2012) 
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009) 
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959) 
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999) 
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and 
Marsh, 1990) 
 
The 39 World Values Survey variables, used in the analysis, are the following: 
 
1. not important in life: Family 
2. not important in life: Friends 
3. not important in life: Leisure time 
4. not important in life: Politics 
5. not important in life: Work 
6. not important in life: Religion 
7. Feeling of unhappiness 
8. State of health (bad) (subjective) 
9. Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
10. Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language 
11. Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 
12. University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 
13. No interest in politics 
14. Supporting larger income differences 
15. [Private vs] state ownership of business 
16. Competition [good or] harmful 
17. Hard work does not bring success 
18. No confidence: The Press 
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19. No confidence: The Police 
20. No confidence: The Government 
21. No confidence: The United Nations 
22. Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 
23. Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 
24. Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 
25. Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. 
26. Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 
27. Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 
28. Importance of democracy 
29. Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
30. Justifiable: Stealing property 
31. Justifiable: Parents beating children 
32. Justifiable: Violence against other people 
33. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
34. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
35. Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 
36. I don’t see myself as a world citizen 
37. Insecurity in neighborhood 
38. Gender (female) 
39. Age 
 
We mention here briefly the salient factor loadings, explaining 10% or more of a 
variable: 
 
The violent and lawless society 
 
0,796 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
0,765 Justifiable: Stealing property 
0,760 Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
0,732 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
0,560 Justifiable: Violence against other people 
0,451 Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 
 
Democracy movement  
 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. 0,753 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,738 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,704 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 0,493 
Importance of democracy 0,493 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,448 
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Climate of personal violence  
 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,846 
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,795 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,786 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,604 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,587 
 
Lack of trust in institutions  
 
No confidence: The Government 0,776 
No confidence: The Police 0,717 
No confidence: The Press 0,715 
No confidence: The United Nations 0,637 
 
Unhappiness, poor health  
 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,771 
Feeling of unhappiness 0,716 
Age 0,440 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen 0,405 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,364 
 
Redistributive religious fundamentalism  
 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,687 
not important in life: Religion -0,596 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,460 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0,389 
 
Rejecting the market economy  
Competition [good or] harmful 0,760 
Hard work does not bring success 0,733 
[Private vs] state ownership of business 0,353 
 
Feminism  
 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717 
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682 
Gender (female) 0,555 
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Distance to politics  
 
No interest in politics 0,849 
not important in life: Politics 0,837 
 
Nihilism  
 
not important in life: Friends 0,690 
not important in life: Leisure time 0,669 
not important in life: Work 0,495 
not important in life: Family 0,478 
 
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics  
 
Supporting larger income differences -0,677 
not important in life: Work 0,467 
not important in life: Religion 0,400 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,395 
 
Our Index construction was based on the following weighting of our factor 
scores by the Eigenvalues of the model 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society   [The violent and 
lawless society -4,263] 
2. Democracy movement      2,574 
3. Climate of personal non-violence    [Climate of personal 
violence -2,260] 
4. Trust in institutions      [Lack of trust in 
institutions -1,929] 
5. Happiness, good health      [Unhappiness, poor 
health -1,864] 
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism   [Redistributive 
religious fundamentalism -1,554] 
7. Accepting the market economy    [Rejecting the market 
economy -1,434] 
8. Feminism        1,245 
9. Involvement in politics     [Distance to politics -
1,197] 
10. Optimism and engagement     [Nihilism -1,141] 
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics [Welfare 
mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics -1,075] 
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This yielded Map 7, based on the factor scores, weighted by their Eigenvalues, 
documented in our statistical appendix: 
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Map 7: Overall Civil Society Index 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Trinidad and Tobago; Australia; Japan; Netherlands 
Worst: India; South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Russia 
 
-12,69 to -10,50
-10,50 to -8,30
-8,30 to -6,11
-6,11 to -3,92
-3,92 to -1,73
-1,73 to 0,47
0,47 to 2,66
2,66 to 4,85
4,85 to 7,05
7,05 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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In Table 2, we summarize the results of our study in a Table. 
 
Table 2: The ranks and percentile performances of African countries on 
our scale of the Development of Civil Society  
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
Global Rank Percentile 
Performance 
Sweden 7,047 1 1,695 
Trinidad and Tobago 5,751 2 3,390 
Australia 5,487 3 5,085 
Japan 5,466 4 6,780 
Netherlands 5,216 5 8,475 
Ghana 4,760 6 10,169 
Germany 4,274 7 11,864 
Uzbekistan 4,250 8 13,559 
Qatar 3,749 9 15,254 
Cyprus 3,500 10 16,949 
Uruguay 3,496 11 18,644 
Spain 3,197 12 20,339 
United States 3,197 13 22,034 
Romania 2,920 14 23,729 
Poland 2,802 15 25,424 
Taiwan 2,745 16 27,119 
Georgia 2,562 17 28,814 
Thailand 2,523 18 30,508 
Turkey 2,121 19 32,203 
South Korea 1,906 20 33,898 
Armenia 1,852 21 35,593 
Zimbabwe 1,789 22 37,288 
Brazil 1,752 23 38,983 
Tunisia 1,656 24 40,678 
China 1,514 25 42,373 
Chile 1,312 26 44,068 
Estonia 1,157 27 45,763 
Malaysia 1,029 28 47,458 
Ecuador 0,945 29 49,153 
Slovenia 0,730 30 50,847 
Colombia 0,631 31 52,542 
Rwanda 0,402 32 54,237 
Argentina 0,342 33 55,932 
Morocco 0,249 34 57,627 
Jordan 0,199 35 59,322 
Libya 0,079 36 61,017 
Nigeria 0,042 37 62,712 
Yemen -0,205 38 64,407 
Azerbaijan -0,301 39 66,102 
Kazakhstan -0,367 40 67,797 
Kuwait -0,840 41 69,492 
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Peru -0,931 42 71,186 
Mexico -0,947 43 72,881 
Kyrgyzstan -0,958 44 74,576 
Pakistan -1,223 45 76,271 
Singapore -1,482 46 77,966 
Hong Kong -1,876 47 79,661 
Belarus -2,711 48 81,356 
Palestinian Occupied 
Territories 
-2,997 49 83,051 
Ukraine -3,060 50 84,746 
Iraq -3,306 51 86,441 
Egypt -3,878 52 88,136 
Algeria -4,422 53 89,831 
Bahrain -4,426 54 91,525 
Russia -4,609 55 93,220 
Lebanon -5,183 56 94,915 
Philippines -5,774 57 96,610 
South Africa -9,691 58 98,305 
India -10,498 59 100,000 
 
The spread in the performance of African countries with complete data is really 
amazing. While we are especially hopeful about the development of future 
democracy in Ghana, our Table suggests on the other hand unfortunately 
pessimistic tendencies for Egypt and Algeria, and especially for Africa’s leading 
economy, South Africa. 
 
Conclusions and policy perspectives 
 
Our investigation based on reliable new global value surveys has shown a great 
diversity of “African values”. Our main results were already shown above; our 
Choropleth maps in our appendix suggest the very wide diversity of 
performances also for the different components of our Index: 
 
African countries among the global top performers in value development 
 
• Involvement in politics: Egypt 
 
• Optimism and engagement: Libya; Nigeria 
 
• No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics: Ghana; 
Zimbabwe 
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African countries among the global top performers and among the global 
bottom league performers in value development 
 
• The non-violent and law-abiding society: among the global top 
performers: Tunisia; among the global bottom league performers: South 
Africa; Algeria 
 
• Happiness, good health: among the global top performers: Nigeria; 
Ghana; Rwanda; among the global bottom league performers: Egypt 
 
• Accepting the market economy: among the global top performers: 
Ghana; Tunisia; Libya; among the global bottom league performers: 
South Africa 
 
African countries among the global bottom league performers in value 
development 
 
• Climate of personal non-violence: Rwanda; South Africa 
 
• Trust in institutions: Tunisia; Egypt; Libya 
 
• No redistributive religious fundamentalism: Egypt 
 
• Feminism: Libya 
 
On an overall basis, one can maintain that the certain optimism, corresponding 
to the economic and human rights data, emerging from Africa, is reflected also 
in our Index of the Development of Civil Society. There is some hope for 
Africa, and a more egalitarian development and a decisive step away from the 
hitherto existing high indices of Human Inequality would accelerate this positive 
scenario. 
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Appendix Table 1: The global frame of reference based on the World Values Survey: Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance 
 
 Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance 
explained 
Cumulative % 
The violent and lawless society 1,000 4,263 10,931 10,931 
Democracy movement 2,000 2,574 6,601 17,532 
Climate of personal violence 3,000 2,260 5,794 23,326 
Lack of trust in institutions 4,000 1,929 4,947 28,273 
Unhappiness, poor health 5,000 1,864 4,779 33,052 
Redistributive religious fundamentalism 6,000 1,554 3,986 37,037 
Rejecting the market economy 7,000 1,434 3,676 40,714 
Feminism 8,000 1,245 3,193 43,907 
Distance to politics 9,000 1,197 3,070 46,977 
Nihilism 10,000 1,141 2,926 49,904 
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work 
ethics 
11,000 1,075 2,756 52,660 
The tolerance and security of the elderly 12,000 1,049 2,690 55,350 
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Appendix Table 2: The global model – factor loadings 
 
 The violent 
and lawless 
society 
Democracy 
movement 
Climate of 
personal 
violence 
Lack of trust 
in 
institutions 
Unhappiness, 
poor health 
Redistributiv
e religious 
fundamentali
sm 
Rejecting the 
market 
economy 
not important in life: Family 0,096 -0,031 0,057 -0,002 0,000 -0,287 0,245 
not important in life: Friends 0,105 -0,056 -0,029 0,085 0,128 -0,023 0,034 
not important in life: Leisure time -0,021 -0,079 0,091 0,024 0,154 0,088 0,025 
not important in life: Politics -0,015 0,009 -0,049 0,148 0,035 -0,088 0,067 
not important in life: Work -0,023 -0,038 0,065 -0,001 0,165 -0,191 0,314 
not important in life: Religion 0,051 0,199 -0,094 0,007 0,034 -0,596 0,265 
Feeling of unhappiness -0,029 0,045 0,038 0,153 0,716 0,000 0,043 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,049 0,000 -0,086 0,043 0,771 0,033 0,093 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other 
people 
-0,014 0,075 -0,113 0,013 0,057 -0,009 -0,120 
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language 0,153 -0,179 -0,009 0,015 0,026 0,175 0,011 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,043 0,105 -0,156 0,047 -0,054 -0,302 0,046 
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl -0,129 0,195 -0,147 0,077 0,014 -0,219 -0,114 
No interest in politics 0,018 -0,042 -0,051 0,108 0,043 0,019 0,027 
Supporting larger income differences 0,003 -0,084 0,066 -0,026 -0,119 0,010 -0,023 
[Private vs] state ownership of business 0,070 0,073 -0,056 -0,047 0,181 0,281 0,353 
Competition [good or] harmful 0,200 -0,134 0,095 -0,047 -0,006 0,060 0,760 
Hard work does not bring success 0,133 -0,068 0,072 0,027 0,026 -0,066 0,733 
No confidence: The Press -0,046 0,047 -0,038 0,715 0,082 -0,100 -0,035 
No confidence: The Police 0,081 0,000 -0,035 0,717 0,093 -0,009 0,019 
No confidence: The Government 0,030 0,030 -0,060 0,776 0,101 -0,095 -0,031 
No confidence: The United Nations -0,089 -0,061 0,095 0,637 0,140 0,090 0,007 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor. 
0,028 0,493 -0,094 -0,018 0,085 0,389 0,178 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,146 -0,002 0,139 -0,037 -0,030 0,687 0,093 
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Democracy: People choose their leaders in free 
elections. 
-0,189 0,738 -0,139 0,040 0,053 -0,020 -0,155 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression. 
-0,128 0,753 -0,106 0,020 0,035 0,026 -0,045 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. -0,075 0,704 -0,211 -0,036 -0,029 -0,055 -0,044 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,088 0,448 -0,036 -0,061 0,068 0,460 0,197 
Importance of democracy -0,153 0,493 -0,186 -0,060 -0,010 -0,091 -0,208 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 0,760 -0,101 0,229 -0,019 -0,014 0,083 0,143 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,765 -0,209 0,587 -0,036 -0,055 0,096 0,228 
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,212 -0,112 0,795 -0,011 -0,051 0,111 -0,003 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,560 -0,181 0,786 -0,006 -0,048 0,023 0,179 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0,796 -0,097 0,300 0,022 -0,024 0,039 0,166 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,732 -0,195 0,604 -0,027 -0,056 0,068 0,211 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,451 -0,172 0,846 -0,019 -0,023 0,111 0,134 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen -0,106 0,016 0,104 0,178 0,405 -0,150 0,059 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,150 -0,047 -0,047 0,161 0,364 0,080 -0,052 
Gender (female) -0,040 -0,097 -0,017 -0,062 0,095 0,303 0,061 
Age -0,113 0,062 -0,146 -0,071 0,440 -0,069 0,080 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued) 
 
 Feminism Distance to 
politics 
Nihilism Welfare 
mentality, 
rejection of 
the Calvinist 
work ethics 
not important in life: Family -0,147 -0,028 0,478 0,212 
not important in life: Friends 0,047 0,129 0,690 -0,025 
not important in life: Leisure time -0,091 0,080 0,669 0,068 
not important in life: Politics 0,065 0,837 0,236 0,125 
not important in life: Work 0,005 0,092 0,495 0,467 
not important in life: Religion 0,072 0,155 0,216 0,400 
Feeling of unhappiness -0,082 0,044 0,139 0,084 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,074 0,005 0,201 0,135 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 0,146 0,052 -0,080 -0,127 
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language -0,250 -0,024 0,136 0,070 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717 0,039 0,023 0,079 
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682 0,055 -0,085 -0,071 
No interest in politics 0,103 0,849 0,019 0,021 
Supporting larger income differences -0,045 -0,029 -0,001 -0,677 
[Private vs] state ownership of business -0,006 0,014 0,024 -0,309 
Competition [good or] harmful -0,002 0,011 0,118 0,102 
Hard work does not bring success -0,037 0,034 0,053 0,084 
No confidence: The Press 0,069 0,133 0,038 -0,012 
No confidence: The Police 0,062 0,105 0,042 -0,020 
No confidence: The Government 0,074 0,129 0,014 0,018 
No confidence: The United Nations -0,127 0,072 0,033 0,041 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. -0,125 0,057 0,027 0,235 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. -0,215 -0,001 0,039 0,034 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,071 -0,004 -0,102 -0,040 
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Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression. 
0,024 -0,006 -0,073 0,080 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,255 0,014 -0,060 0,093 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal -0,138 0,089 0,006 0,395 
Importance of democracy 0,143 -0,145 -0,142 -0,269 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits -0,069 0,023 0,061 0,034 
Justifiable: Stealing property -0,100 -0,062 0,102 0,082 
Justifiable: Parents beating children -0,108 -0,020 0,002 -0,057 
Justifiable: Violence against other people -0,118 -0,068 0,087 0,066 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport -0,031 0,023 0,057 0,069 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe -0,104 -0,044 0,102 0,078 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife -0,189 -0,079 0,064 0,057 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen -0,123 0,174 0,041 0,128 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,120 0,034 0,074 -0,045 
Gender (female) 0,555 0,160 0,051 0,078 
Age 0,087 -0,208 0,218 0,193 
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Appendix Table 3: Correlation matrix of components at the global level. Correlations greater than or equal to +-.100 
 
Component The 
violent 
and 
lawless 
society 
democrac
y 
movemen
t 
climate of 
personal 
violence 
lack of 
trust in 
institutio
ns 
unhappin
ess, poor 
health 
redistrib
utive 
religious 
fundame
ntalism 
rejecting 
the 
market 
economy 
feminism distance 
to politics 
nihilism 
democracy movement -0,139          
climate of personal violence 0,405 -0,225         
lack of trust in institutions           
unhappiness, poor health    0,138       
redistributive religious 
fundamentalism 
          
rejecting the market economy 0,236  0,125        
feminism   -0,201   -0,120     
distance to politics    0,161       
nihilism 0,105    0,198 -0,100 0,261  0,101  
welfare mentality, rejection of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
 0,120   0,103  0,324 -0,101 0,108 0,295 
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Appendix Table 4: The overall development of civil society on a global scale – factor scores 
 
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
The non-
violent and 
law-abiding 
society 
Democracy 
movement 
Climate of 
personal 
non-violence 
Trust in 
institutions 
Happiness, 
good health 
No 
redistributiv
e religious 
fundamentali
sm 
Accepting 
the market 
economy 
Sweden 7,047 0,163 1,741 0,704 0,457 0,429 2,001 -0,080 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
5,751 1,802 -0,199 0,166 -0,559 0,524 0,568 1,169 
Australia 5,487 1,104 0,908 0,872 -0,121 0,304 1,810 0,158 
Japan 5,466 1,479 0,383 1,245 0,403 -0,443 1,689 -0,032 
Netherlands 5,216 1,878 1,219 0,839 -0,075 -0,109 1,860 -0,726 
Ghana 4,760 1,918 -0,586 -0,476 0,724 1,094 -0,271 1,041 
Germany 4,274 1,583 1,551 0,504 0,286 -0,108 1,480 -0,535 
Uzbekistan 4,250 0,561 1,106 -0,059 3,009 0,681 -0,698 0,388 
Qatar 3,749 1,775 -1,095 -0,149 1,738 1,267 -1,121 0,032 
Cyprus 3,500 1,295 0,493 0,929 -0,419 0,080 0,528 0,014 
Uruguay 3,496 0,632 0,712 1,024 0,140 0,017 1,016 -0,578 
Spain 3,197 0,606 1,545 1,217 -0,415 0,049 0,917 -0,357 
United States 3,197 0,837 -0,105 0,292 -0,490 0,110 1,300 0,418 
Romania 2,920 1,685 1,026 1,081 -0,757 -0,714 0,263 0,464 
Poland 2,802 0,574 1,012 1,086 -0,622 -0,084 0,485 -0,458 
Taiwan 2,745 0,446 1,552 -0,269 -0,151 0,295 0,759 0,229 
Georgia 2,562 2,544 -0,350 0,876 -0,768 -1,114 0,153 0,337 
Thailand 2,523 0,490 0,310 0,989 0,298 0,388 -0,519 -0,240 
Turkey 2,121 1,819 0,692 1,001 0,367 -0,004 -0,920 -0,280 
South Korea 1,906 -0,190 0,175 1,222 0,377 -0,328 0,484 -0,074 
Armenia 1,852 1,377 0,607 0,984 -0,657 -0,579 -0,246 0,288 
Zimbabwe 1,789 0,554 -0,284 -1,172 0,094 0,393 0,021 0,782 
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Brazil 1,752 0,314 0,110 0,389 -0,734 0,119 0,356 0,382 
Tunisia 1,656 2,181 0,369 -0,134 -1,449 0,033 -0,538 0,893 
China 1,514 -0,177 1,264 -0,442 1,632 0,047 1,001 -0,452 
Chile 1,312 -0,335 1,179 1,587 0,006 -0,556 0,168 -0,332 
Estonia 1,157 -0,197 1,538 1,077 0,398 -0,952 0,707 -0,498 
Malaysia 1,029 -0,709 0,043 0,082 1,027 0,793 -1,104 0,352 
Ecuador 0,945 -0,890 -0,625 1,127 -0,153 0,597 -0,466 0,410 
Slovenia 0,730 0,545 1,027 0,745 -1,054 -0,206 1,237 -0,405 
Colombia 0,631 -0,538 -0,506 0,740 -0,345 0,587 0,092 0,091 
Rwanda 0,402 2,179 -0,507 -2,507 0,456 1,056 -0,172 0,109 
Argentina 0,342 -0,406 0,576 0,945 -0,793 -0,174 0,564 -0,350 
Morocco 0,249 1,168 1,003 0,032 -0,332 0,423 -1,076 0,071 
Jordan 0,199 2,463 -0,761 0,156 -0,202 -0,132 -1,047 0,233 
Libya 0,079 1,138 -0,607 -0,363 -1,206 0,518 -0,896 0,862 
Nigeria 0,042 0,616 -1,068 -0,853 -0,177 1,123 -0,707 0,325 
Yemen -0,205 2,300 0,585 -1,019 -1,615 -0,148 -1,357 1,130 
Azerbaijan -0,301 2,801 -0,338 0,331 0,231 -0,627 0,007 -0,814 
Kazakhstan -0,367 -0,669 0,948 0,254 0,697 -0,458 -0,025 -0,704 
Kuwait -0,840 -0,423 -0,956 -0,264 0,223 0,861 -0,730 0,199 
Peru -0,931 -1,640 -0,185 0,980 -0,990 -0,359 0,198 0,416 
Mexico -0,947 -3,110 -0,442 1,012 -0,796 0,656 -0,037 0,538 
Kyrgyzstan -0,958 -1,065 -0,963 0,594 0,499 0,070 -0,269 0,016 
Pakistan -1,223 1,273 0,302 0,654 -1,108 0,613 -1,738 -0,149 
Singapore -1,482 -0,266 -1,019 -1,241 1,140 0,267 0,195 -0,383 
Hong Kong -1,876 -2,016 0,031 0,181 0,643 -0,467 0,807 -0,351 
Belarus -2,711 -0,558 -0,006 0,536 -0,023 -1,414 0,551 -0,361 
Palestinian 
Occupied 
Territories 
-2,997 0,724 -1,245 -0,618 -0,962 -0,611 -0,736 0,589 
Ukraine -3,060 -0,630 1,269 0,733 -0,653 -1,526 -0,159 -0,730 
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Iraq -3,306 1,105 -0,373 -0,728 -0,794 -0,934 -1,119 0,543 
Egypt -3,878 1,458 0,809 -1,111 -1,273 -3,046 -1,525 0,836 
Algeria -4,422 -2,077 -0,133 -0,866 -0,705 -0,202 -0,413 0,261 
Bahrain -4,426 0,912 -3,032 -0,221 0,989 -0,143 0,405 -1,580 
Russia -4,609 -1,455 0,750 0,676 -0,658 -1,301 0,188 -0,804 
Lebanon -5,183 -1,664 -1,416 -0,551 -1,107 -0,171 0,111 -0,172 
Philippines -5,774 -4,228 -0,695 -1,229 0,965 0,182 -1,184 0,109 
South Africa -9,691 -5,075 -0,757 -2,445 0,186 0,438 -0,961 -0,826 
India -10,498 -4,656 -2,702 -1,989 0,798 0,404 -0,093 -0,489 
 
Appendix Table 4: (continued) 
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
Feminism Involvement in politics Optimism and 
engagement 
No welfare mentality, 
acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
Sweden 7,047 0,958 0,503 0,309 -0,138 
Trinidad and Tobago 5,751 1,070 0,004 0,190 1,015 
Australia 5,487 0,708 0,053 0,060 -0,368 
Japan 5,466 0,155 0,824 0,002 -0,240 
Netherlands 5,216 0,669 0,381 -0,252 -0,467 
Ghana 4,760 -0,155 0,033 0,408 1,031 
Germany 4,274 0,350 0,273 -0,290 -0,819 
Uzbekistan 4,250 -0,542 0,006 0,130 -0,332 
Qatar 3,749 -0,526 0,505 0,643 0,681 
Cyprus 3,500 0,528 -0,131 0,467 -0,283 
Uruguay 3,496 0,862 -0,373 0,139 -0,094 
Spain 3,197 0,514 -0,594 0,168 -0,453 
United States 3,197 0,668 0,342 0,002 -0,177 
Romania 2,920 0,329 -0,437 -0,257 0,236 
Poland 2,802 0,396 -0,111 0,140 0,386 
Taiwan 2,745 0,312 -0,553 0,157 -0,031 
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Georgia 2,562 0,120 -0,114 0,476 0,403 
Thailand 2,523 0,050 0,879 -0,231 0,110 
Turkey 2,121 -0,380 0,086 0,192 -0,453 
South Korea 1,906 0,114 0,016 0,040 0,071 
Armenia 1,852 0,023 -0,321 0,096 0,280 
Zimbabwe 1,789 0,242 0,012 0,263 0,885 
Brazil 1,752 0,701 -0,173 0,074 0,214 
Tunisia 1,656 -0,585 -0,127 0,467 0,547 
China 1,514 -0,202 0,006 -0,304 -0,858 
Chile 1,312 0,484 -0,659 0,141 -0,370 
Estonia 1,157 0,248 -0,381 -0,015 -0,767 
Malaysia 1,029 -0,328 0,147 0,253 0,473 
Ecuador 0,945 0,546 -0,101 0,140 0,362 
Slovenia 0,730 0,509 -0,658 -0,075 -0,935 
Colombia 0,631 0,715 -0,582 0,015 0,363 
Rwanda 0,402 -0,100 0,257 0,238 -0,610 
Argentina 0,342 0,523 -0,295 -0,086 -0,162 
Morocco 0,249 -0,322 -0,463 -0,182 -0,072 
Jordan 0,199 -0,816 -0,390 0,131 0,565 
Libya 0,079 -0,768 0,237 0,538 0,625 
Nigeria 0,042 -0,455 0,181 0,533 0,523 
Yemen -0,205 -0,904 0,076 0,074 0,673 
Azerbaijan -0,301 -0,597 -0,808 -0,286 -0,201 
Kazakhstan -0,367 -0,074 -0,143 0,007 -0,201 
Kuwait -0,840 -0,945 0,521 0,215 0,461 
Peru -0,931 0,789 -0,285 -0,333 0,480 
Mexico -0,947 0,691 -0,235 0,285 0,491 
Kyrgyzstan -0,958 -0,082 0,332 -0,242 0,151 
Pakistan -1,223 -0,697 -0,233 -0,349 0,209 
Singapore -1,482 0,088 -0,057 0,036 -0,241 
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Hong Kong -1,876 0,122 -0,211 -0,268 -0,345 
Belarus -2,711 -0,098 -0,363 -0,319 -0,657 
Palestinian Occupied 
Territories 
-2,997 -0,726 0,144 0,065 0,381 
Ukraine -3,060 0,104 -0,465 -0,203 -0,799 
Iraq -3,306 -0,727 -0,204 -0,134 0,061 
Egypt -3,878 -0,644 0,569 0,027 0,022 
Algeria -4,422 -0,691 -0,139 0,069 0,474 
Bahrain -4,426 -0,868 0,655 -1,284 -0,258 
Russia -4,609 -0,159 -0,515 -0,416 -0,916 
Lebanon -5,183 -0,211 0,216 -0,169 -0,048 
Philippines -5,774 -0,198 0,506 -0,344 0,341 
South Africa -9,691 -0,137 0,158 -0,188 -0,084 
India -10,498 -0,759 0,283 -0,940 -0,354 
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Appendix Map 1: The non-violent and law-abiding society 
 
 
 
Best: Azerbaijan; Georgia; Jordan; Yemen; Tunisia 
Worst: South Africa; India; Philippines; Mexico; Algeria 
  
-6,06 to -5,08
-5,08 to -4,09
-4,09 to -3,11
-3,11 to -2,12
-2,12 to -1,14
-1,14 to -0,15
-0,15 to 0,83
0,83 to 1,82
1,82 to 2,80
2,80 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 2: Democracy movement 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Taiwan; Germany; Spain; Estonia 
Worst: Bahrain; India; Lebanon; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Qatar 
  
-3,63 to -3,03
-3,03 to -2,44
-2,44 to -1,84
-1,84 to -1,24
-1,24 to -0,65
-0,65 to -0,05
-0,05 to 0,55
0,55 to 1,14
1,14 to 1,74
1,74 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 3: Climate of personal non-violence 
 
 
 
Best: Chile; Japan; Korea, South; Spain; Ecuador 
Worst: Rwanda; South Africa; India; Singapore; Philippines 
  
-3,02 to -2,51
-2,51 to -2,00
-2,00 to -1,48
-1,48 to -0,97
-0,97 to -0,46
-0,46 to 0,05
0,05 to 0,56
0,56 to 1,08
1,08 to 1,59
1,59 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 4: Trust in institutions 
 
 
 
Best: Uzbekistan; Qatar; China; Singapore; Malaysia 
Worst: Yemen; Tunisia; Egypt; Libya; Pakistan 
  
-2,19 to -1,62
-1,62 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,46
-0,46 to 0,12
0,12 to 0,70
0,70 to 1,28
1,28 to 1,85
1,85 to 2,43
2,43 to 3,01
3,01 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 5: Happiness, good health 
 
 
 
Best: Qatar; Nigeria; Ghana; Rwanda; Kuwait 
Worst: Egypt; Ukraine; Belarus; Russia; Georgia 
  
-3,59 to -3,05
-3,05 to -2,51
-2,51 to -1,97
-1,97 to -1,43
-1,43 to -0,89
-0,89 to -0,35
-0,35 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,73
0,73 to 1,27
1,27 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 6: no redistributive religious fundamentalism 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Netherlands; Australia; Japan; Germany 
Worst: Pakistan; Egypt; Yemen; Philippines; Qatar 
  
-2,21 to -1,74
-1,74 to -1,27
-1,27 to -0,80
-0,80 to -0,34
-0,34 to 0,13
0,13 to 0,60
0,60 to 1,07
1,07 to 1,53
1,53 to 2,00
2,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 7: Accepting the market economy 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Yemen; Ghana; Tunisia; Libya 
Worst: Bahrain; South Africa; Azerbaijan; Russia; Ukraine 
  
-1,92 to -1,58
-1,58 to -1,24
-1,24 to -0,89
-0,89 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,21
-0,21 to 0,14
0,14 to 0,48
0,48 to 0,83
0,83 to 1,17
1,17 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 8: Feminism 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Sweden; Uruguay; Peru; Colombia 
Worst: Kuwait; Yemen; Bahrain; Jordan; Libya 
  
-1,20 to -0,95
-0,95 to -0,69
-0,69 to -0,44
-0,44 to -0,19
-0,19 to 0,06
0,06 to 0,31
0,31 to 0,57
0,57 to 0,82
0,82 to 1,07
1,07 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 9: Involvement in politics 
 
 
 
Best: Thailand; Japan; Bahrain; Egypt; Kuwait 
Worst: Azerbaijan; Chile; Slovenia; Spain; Colombia 
  
-1,02 to -0,81
-0,81 to -0,60
-0,60 to -0,39
-0,39 to -0,18
-0,18 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,25
0,25 to 0,46
0,46 to 0,67
0,67 to 0,88
0,88 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 10: Optimism and engagement 
 
 
 
Best: Qatar; Libya; Nigeria; Georgia; Cyprus 
Worst: Bahrain; India; Russia; Pakistan; Philippines 
  
-1,52 to -1,28
-1,28 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,80
-0,80 to -0,56
-0,56 to -0,32
-0,32 to -0,08
-0,08 to 0,16
0,16 to 0,40
0,40 to 0,64
0,64 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 11: No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Qatar; Yemen 
Worst: Slovenia; Russia; China; Germany; Ukraine 
 
 
-1,18 to -0,94
-0,94 to -0,69
-0,69 to -0,44
-0,44 to -0,20
-0,20 to 0,05
0,05 to 0,29
0,29 to 0,54
0,54 to 0,79
0,79 to 1,03
1,03 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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